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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
TWIN FALLS COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho, and the
BOARD OF TWIN FALLS COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS, the CITY OF
TWIN FALLS, the CITY OF HANSEN,
the CITY OF FILER, the CITY OF BUHL;
TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho, and the BOARD OF
TETON COUNTY COMMISSIONERS;
OWYHEE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State ofldaho, and the
BOARD OF OWYHEE COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS; and KOOTENAI
COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State
of Idaho, and the BOARD OF
KOOTENAI COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

Petitioners,
VS.

IDAHO COMMISSION ON
REDISTRICTING and Ben YSURSA,
Secretary of State of the State of Idaho

Respondents.
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PETITIONER'S BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF PETITION CHALLENGING LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING,
APPLICATION OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, AND APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF
PROHIBITION
Grant P. Loebs, Prosecutor
By Jennifer Gose
Chief Civil Deputy Prosecutor
P.O. Box 126
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126
Attorney for Petitioners:
Twin Falls County, City of
Twin Falls, City of Hansen, City
of Filer, City of Buhl, Teton County,
Owyhee County, and Kootenai County

Lawrence Wasden, Attorney General
Brian Kane
Assistant Chief Deputy
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Attorney for Respondents:
Idaho Commission on Redistricting and
Ben Ysursa, Secretary of the State ofldaho
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III.

INTRODUCTION

Petitioners respectfully reply to Respondent's Brief by refocusing the disagreement on
the core of the complaint in the Petition: That the Redistricting Commission impermissibly
violated the Idaho Constitution by unnecessarily dividing several Idaho counties in the
redistricting plan submitted as Plan L87.
IV.

ARGUMENT

A. Petitioners Have Standirnz to Challenge the Redistricting Commission's Plan

Petitioners have standing to argue that the entirety of Plan L 87 is unconstitutional. As
Respondents pointed out, Petitioners must, "allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a
substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury."
Miles v. Idaho Povver Co., 116 Idaho 635,641, 778 P.2d 757. 763 (1989). Respondents then

jump from this principle to the conclusion that Petitioners cannot challenge the Commission's
actions in legislative districts other than those in which their counties are located.
However, Petitioners are first challenging the entirety of Plan L87 as being
unconstitutional, and second, contend that the districts, as pieces of a puzzle, cannot be discussed
separately without discussing where all the parts of the plan fail. The failure of the Redistricting
Commission to adhere to the Idaho Constitution's prohibition against unnecessarily splitting
counties in one area of the state has widespread effects across the length and breadth of Idaho.
We cannot address nor correct the damage caused in any one district, or to any one county,
without correcting the unconstitutional actions taken by the Commission in other parts of the
state. Individual counties and districts cannot be discu5,sed in a vacuum. Petitioners must be
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able to challenge what the Redistricting Commission did throughout the state, and how those
failures effect Petitioners' counties, cities and citizens. Therefore, Petitioners must be allowed to
challenge all the areas where Plan L87 is unconstitutional.
Beyond its flawed analysis of the standing argument, Respondent's Brief
mischaracterizes the Petitioners' argument in many key ways.

B. Plan L87 Unconstitutionally Splits Counties
The crux of the Petitioners' argument is that the Commission denigrated the requirement
clearly stated in Article III, §5 of the Idaho Constitution and placed it below various statutory
and optional considerations, such as those regarding communities of interest, traditional
neighborhoods, district compactness, and road connections. Petitioners continue to assert that
counties shall not be divided unless required to meet standards of equal protection. Only when
counties must be split to achieve the one-person, one-vote mandate, do we look to Idaho Code §
72-1506 for direction as to how to do so. The Commission and Respondents would have us look
to§ 72-1506 for reasons to split counties.
Respondents incorrectly assert that Petitioners did not address the Commission's
justifications for its actions. Precisely the opposite is true. Petitioners addressed in detail the
Commission's Findings and Conclusions, and uniformly reject the Commission's justifications
as being mere excuses for failing to follow the Idaho Constitution's clear preclusion against
unnecessary division of counties. Respondent's arguments are essentially a verbatim restatement
of the Commission's justifications. Respondent's- argument is basically this:
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We started in the N01ih. We decided to divide Kootenai County because we
elevated communities of interest, district compactness, and road connection above
the Constitution. We did the same thing in Canyon and Gem Counties. Once we
split those counties up in violation of the Constitution, we really had no choice
but to take an axe to Owyhee County ... Once we did that, we had to mutilate
Twin Falls County ... Once we did that, we had to mangle Bannock and Bingham
Counties ...
Essentially, this describes a domino set up, where once the flawed decision is made to
split one county based on a skewed analysis which elevates statute above constitution, we are
condemned to repeat the process until the entire redistricting plan is an integrated
unconstitutional mess. Thus, Respondent can make the otherwise absurd argument that, "Due to
Owyhee County's location, the Commission chose to split Owyhee county between two districts
to meet the one-person, one-vote requirement in surrounding districts." (Respondent's Brief, p.
13) This argument can only be made once the Commission screws up everything to the North of
Owyhee County and has painted itself into a comer. I
Respondent also erroneously claims that Petitioners· goal is to "simply substitute their
own plan" (Respondent's Brief, p. 3), "seek to substitute their own judgment" (Respondent's
Brief, p. 4), and to "propose different exercises of discretion regarding county splits."
(Respondent's Brief, p. 10) This failure to understand Petitioners' argument causes Respondent
to falsely conclude that, "the basis of Petitioners' challenge is an attempt to elevate their
respective counties over the interest of other counties." (Respondent's Brief, p. 16, and again on
p. 17) Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, Petitioners' Plan neither cuts nor

I This again highlights the fallacy in Respondent's standing argument. Clearly, to rectify the unnecessary divisions
made in the Petitioners' County's, the Court needs to .address.the .errors in o.ther counties, which, when compounded,
are presented by Respondent a justification for those divisions.
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disadvantages any other county in proposing a constitutional approach to redistricting. It has
been the guiding principle of Petitioners' argument that as few counties as possible be divided,
and those, "only to the extent it is reasonably determined by statute that it is necessary to create
senatorial and representative districts which comply with the constitution of the United States."
(Idaho Constitution, Article III, §5)2 Petitioners' Plan, in fact, was provided not so much to
serve as a template for the Court to simply adopt, as to show in dramatic, concrete terms that the
Commission's claims of"necessity" in splitting 11 Idaho Counties are misplaced. If it is really
"necessary" to split 11 counties to achieve one-person, one-vote, then it should be difficult to
come up with a plan which both achieves a lower divergence and splits half as manv counties.
Nonetheless, Petitioners' Plan achieves that very result, and does so without shifting any of the
disadvantages visited on our counties by the Commission's Plan to others.
Indeed, it is not the Commission's choice among options when counties must be split that
Petitioners argue against; rather it is the Commission's arbitrary choice to split counties which,
under our Constitution, must not be split, with which Petitioners disagree. It is when the
Commission exercised its authority outside the scope of the delegation of power given it by the
Idaho Constitution that it loses the "deference" advocated for it by the Respondent. The
Commission is due no deference for the exercise of power it does not have.

2 Evidence of the Petitioner's desire to avoid visiting misery on its neighbors can be found even before the
Commission enacted its plan and this case commenced. Respondent's Appendix A, wherein Attorney for Petitioner
was asked during his testimony before the Reapportionment Committee's Public Hearing in Twin Falls on June 29,
2011, which counties he would divide, if not Twin Falls, "Mr. Loebs indicated that he would have to look at the map
because he doesn't want to hack up another county any more than he wants his county hacked up." Respondent's
Brief, Appendix A, p. 3.
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Likewise, the factors listed in I.C. §72-1506, and reiterated by the Court in Bingham
rd

County v. Idaho Com 'nfor Reapportionment, 137 Idaho 870, 874, 55 P. 3 863, 867 (Idaho
2002) and Bonneville County v. Ysursa, 142 Idaho 464,468, 129 P. yct 1213, 1217 (Idaho 2005),
come into play only when a county must be divided under Article III, §5. The Court has
repeatedly made it very clear that counties shall not be split unless it is necessary to meet the
standards of equal protection. Other statutory considerations are subordinate. Id.
It is not Petitioners' contention that the Commission's Plan L87 is unconstitutional

because it has a deviation of nearly 10% (9.92%), but that it has this very high deviation because
it unconstitutionally splits counties. Thus, the unconstitutional splitting of counties ~ the
"unconstitutional or irrational state purpose," prohibited by Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725,
740-44 (1983).
Respondent claims that, "The Counties that were split by the Commission were split in
order to comply with the one-person, one-vote requirement, to preserve communities of interest,
and to create compact districts in the face ofldaho's geographic challenges." (Respondent's
Brief, p. 11.) But, because only divisions which are necessary to comply with the one-person,
one-vote mandate of the U.S. Constitution are legal, the other listed considerations are mere
excuses. The reasoning in Respondent's Brief falls into the same trap as does the Commission in
its Findings and Conclusions when it elevates the statutory language of Idaho Code § 72-1506 to
the same (or higher) level as the Idaho Constitution.
Respondents, perhaps tongue-in-cheek, argue that the Petitioners' argument relegates
reapportionmentto'~little more than a mathematical exercise'' (Respondent's Brief, p. 10). With
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just as much credibility, Petitioners could argue that Respondent's elevation of "district
compactness" to a level on a par with the Constitution's protection of county integrity would
result in 35 differently-sized, identically-populated boxes with no attention paid to county lines
at all. Both of these arguments are absurd. The Constitution of the United States, the
Constitution ofldaho, the Statutes of the State ofldaho, and the Court's interpretation of those
laws give very clear direction to the Redistricting Commission-and to this Court. The
hierarchy is as clear as it can be:
1.

Satisfy the U.S. Constitutional requirement for one-person, one-vote. If you must,
divide counties to do so.

2. Keep counties whole.
3. If you must divide counties, follow the guidelines in LC.§ 72-1506, as much as
possible.
The Commission's fatal mistake in concocting Plan L87, a mistake echoed in
Respondent's Brief, is that it lost track of this simple hierarchy. By its own admission, the
Commission used LC. § 72-1506 factors to justify dividing counties when no such division was
necessary to conform to one-person, one-vote. Because of this blindness to the supremacy of the
Idaho Constitution, the Commission's plan must fail. Because of the Commission's initial
analytical failure, the Respondent's Brief is forced into tortured logic to defend it.J

3 For example, the justification given on pages l l -13 for the division of Kootenai County into four districts--two of
which are joined with other counties: Kootenai County, the Respondents say, is too big to be three districts, being
the size of 3.092 districts. The Commission's Solution: put it in FOUR districts! The result: FOUR districts with an
average divergence of 3.4% from ideal, rather than THREfrwith an average divergence of 3 .1 %. This makes
nonsense of the Idaho Constitution. Using this logic, the ONLY county the Commission would be precluded from
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In pages 11-15 of their brief, Respondents essentially just lay out the same argument as
the Commission's Findings and Conclusions, painting a fatalistic picture detailing how once the
dominoes are set up, all we can do is watch them fall, notwithstanding that the first dominos set
up when Kootenai and Canyon Counties were unconstitutionally split can actually be changed,
thus saving the rest of the state.
Pages 17-20 of Respondent's Brief are devoted to more justification that splitting
counties is mandated by considerations such as preserving traditional neighborhoods and
communities of interest, keeping Native American tribes in one district, joining "portions of
counties that were connected by major roads and highways," and achieving district compactness.
These goals, though desirable, do not trump the requirements ofldaho's Constitution.
Petitioners do not seek to substitute their discretion for that of the Commission, or their
plan for Plan L87. Petitioners seek to have the Court instruct the Commission to follow the clear
law of the State of Idaho. If Respondents do not like the law as it is, they should seek to change
it, but as long as the Idaho Constitution contains a clear prohibition against unnecessary division
of counties in reapportionment, the Idaho Redistricting Commission must comply with that
prohibition.
V. CONCLUSION
Legislative Plan L87 adopted by the Idaho Redistricting Commission is unconstitutional
in that it impermissibly splits a number of counties that did not need to be split to achieve the
U.S. Constitution's equal protection requirements. In justifying its actions, Respondents give a
dividing would be one where the population was exactly 44, 788 2- or exact multiples thereof.
35

Petitioners' Reply Brief -7

number ofreasons which do not justify dividing those counties, particularly when it is shown
that a plan can be developed that complies with all federal and state constitutional and statutory
requirements and splits fewer counties and achieves a lower divergence.
For these reasons, Petitioners respectfully ask the Court to declare Legislative Plan L87
unconstitutional and direct the Redistricting Commission to adopt a plan which complies with
the United States and Idaho State Constitutions.

Respectfully Submitted this 2J1h day of December, 2011.

Prosecuting Attorney for Twin Falls County

On behalf of Petitioners, Twin Falls County,
the City of Twin Falls, the City of Hansen,
the City of Filer, the City of Buhl, Teton County,
Owyhee County and Kootenai County
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